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Abstract
Sacred values are different from secular values in that they are often associated with violations of the cost-beneﬁt logic
of rational choice models. Previous work on sacred values has been largely limited to religious or territorial conﬂicts
deeply embedded in historical contexts. In this work we ﬁnd that the Iranian nuclear program, a relatively recent
development, is treated as sacred by some Iranians, leading to a greater disapproval of deals which involve monetary
incentives to end the program. Our results suggest that depending on the prevalence of such values, incentive-focused
negotiations may backﬁre.
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1 Introduction
At least since the end of the Second World War economic
and foreign policy decision-making has been dominated
by the “rational actor” perspective which assumes that
decision-makers model the world on the basis of ratio-
nal choice (“cost-beneﬁt”) calculations that are commen-
surable across cultures (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Al-
though it is well accepted that decision makers often fail
to make normatively rational choices, the assumption that
they nonetheless are seeking to maximize utility dom-
inates. For example, the makeup and performance of
the principal forums for U.S. policy (National Security
Presidential Directive, 2001; National Economic Coun-
cil, 2006) leaves little doubt that policy decisions should
result from instrumental choices by goal-oriented polit-
ical and economic actors. The ofﬁcial national security
strategy of the United States explicitly states a commit-
ment to “results-oriented planning” that focuses on “ac-
tions and results rather than . . . rule-making” (National
Security Strategy of the United States, 2006).
Recent work on “protected” (Baron & Spranca, 1997;
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Ritov & Baron, 1999) or “sacred” (Tetlock, 2003) val-
ues has challenged the presumption that issues under
dispute in inter-group conﬂicts are fungible and can be
valued along a common scale. This new body of re-
search has emphasized that protagonists in disputes often
invest values with transcendental qualities (Durkheim,
1912/1995) which affect decision-making. For example
in a large scale study of Israelis and Palestinians, Ginges,
Atran, Medin & Shikaki (2007) presented subjects with
peace deals involving mutual compromises over core is-
sues, such as the future of Jerusalem, and experimentally
varied incentives to compromise within each deal. In
sharp contrast with the rational actor perspective, subjects
who viewed the issues under dispute as sacred values re-
sponded with greater outrage to deals with added material
incentives to compromise those values. Material incen-
tives to compromise backﬁred presumably because they
made salient the taboo against measuring commitment to
sacred values along instrumental metrics. However, this
paradoxical effect held only for people who treated the is-
sue as a sacred value and not for those who saw the values
as important but not sacred.
The existing empirical work on sacred values has been
focused predominantly on conﬂicts embedded in a com-
plex historical contexts often marking the life and identity
of several generations (Atran, Axelrod & Davis, 2007),
such as, dealing with issues such as sovereignty over
Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank (Ginges et al., 2007;
Rozin & Wolf, 2008), conﬂict over the Babri Mosque
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in India (Sachdeva & Medin, 2009), and centuries old
Sharia law in Indonesia (Ginges & Atran, 2009). Yet, it
seems possible that issues with a much narrower histor-
ical context can become sacred values, especially when
they involve identity-related issues such as sovereignty.
In the research reported here, we investigate whether such
values would also lead to judgments and decisions that
would not be instrumentally rational. Speciﬁcally, we fo-
cus on Iran’s stance on its national nuclear program, using
it as a test bed for emerging sacred values.
In the past few years, the Iranian government has ac-
tively defended its right to having a nuclear program in
part by framing the dispute as analogues to past histori-
cal events in which the advancement of the Iranian nation
was interrupted by foreign powers. Speciﬁcally, the Ira-
nian government has made “a conscious effort to link the
proliferation issue to the struggle for nationalization of
oil half a century ago, a struggle that continues to strongly
resonate with the Iranian people” (J. Afary, personal com-
munication, December 14, 2009). By drawing paral-
lels between these events, the nuclear dispute is essen-
tially framed as an ongoing resistance with deep histor-
ical context. Consequently, the Iranian government has
vigorously defended its “inalienable rights” (“Iran Ready
to Talk”, 2009) for having the program: at recent news
conference Iran’s Foreign Minister Motakki argued, “we
cannot have any compromise with respect to the Iranian
nation’s inalienable right” to acquire a nuclear capabil-
ity (Jaseb & Dahl, 2009). While the public discourse in
the West about the Iranian nuclear program is focused
on risks, costs and beneﬁts, the Iranian position that they
“will not retreat one iota” (“Iran Vows”, 2007) and “will
’never ever’ compromise on nuclear dispute” (“Iran will
’never ever”’, 2009) is mainly in the domain of sacred
rhetoric (Marietta, 2009).
We investigated whether Iranians who treat the Iranian
nuclear program as a sacred value would be amenable to
material incentives to compromise. The U.S. and its al-
lies, including the U.K. and France, are currently con-
templating material “sanctions that bite” (Obama, 2009).
It is critical, therefore, to know what the possible reac-
tions of Iranians to sanctions may be. Our results have
both theoretical and pragmatic implications, suggesting
that depending on the prevalence of such sacred values,
incentive-focused negotiations may backﬁre.
2 Method
Seventy-ﬁve Iranian subjects (mean age = 27.8; 34 fe-
males, 41 males; 96% having at least a bachelor’s de-
gree) participated in an online survey conducted in En-
glish. Subjects were recruited using snowball sampling
which consisted of asking subjects to forward the link
to the survey to any number of people that they know.
First, we assessed subjects’ values regarding the Iranian
nuclear program using Baron and Spranca’s (1997) mea-
sure. The subjects were offered a choice between four
options regarding the possibility of Iran giving up its nu-
clear program:
a. I think this deﬁnitely needs to happen.
b. I do not object this.
c. This is acceptable only if the beneﬁts of stopping the
program are great enough.
d. This is shouldn’t be done no matter how great the
beneﬁts are.
The subjects who answered “d” were categorized as hold-
ing this issue as a sacred value. Next, in two between-
subject conditions the subjects evaluated a hypothetical
deal on the Iranian nuclear program. Half of them re-
sponded to the following “Taboo” deal:
Imagine the following hypothetical situation:
Iran will give up its nuclear program, while US
will drastically reduce its military aid to Israel.
The other half of our subjects responded to a “Taboo+”
deal which was the Taboo deal plus an added material
incentive:
Imagine the following hypothetical situation:
Iran will give up its nuclear program, while US
will drastically reduce its military aid to Israel.
In addition the EU will pay $40 billion to Iran.1
Wemeasured support/opposition to the deal indirectly be-
cause of political sensitivities. Subjects were asked to
predict the extent to which the Iranian people would ap-
prove of the deal, be angry about the deal, and believe
that the deal was intended to mislead Iranians. This last
item was added in order to control for the possibility that
people who hold a sacred value might see the instrumen-
tal incentive as a signal for a bad compromise and feel
suspicious about the deal. Each question was answered
on a 6-point scale (1 = they will deﬁnitely disapprove it,
6 = they will deﬁnitely approve it; 1 = they will deﬁnitely
get angry, 6 = they will deﬁnitely not get angry; 1 = the
deal is deﬁnitely not misleading, 6 = the deal is deﬁnitely
misleading).
1It is worthy to note that in politics often cash incentives are used
both for reparation and compromise. Germany’s offer of material aid
to Israel, which Israel initially rejected although the country was in dire
ﬁnancial straits (Lustick, 2006) and Japan’s offer to give monetary com-
pensation to countries that it had subjected to sexual slavery (Onishi,
2007) are among examples where cash incentives were used for repara-
tion. More recently, US offered $25 million for information leading to
capture of Osama bin Laden, which violated a sacred Pashtun value that
tribesmen are generally willing to defend to the death (Atran, 2009).
Moreover, the removal or lifting of economic sanctions could be seen
as a form of cash incentive, although we did not present it that way.
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Figure 1: Predicted approval (means, with standard-error
bars) as a function of additional Incentives (Taboo vs
Taboo+) and Sacred Value (SV). Each small gray point
is a subject.
3 Results
Eleven percent (8 subjects) perceived the Iranian nuclear
program as a SV (choice d; 23% selected choice a, 15%
choice b, 52% choice c). For predicted anger and pre-
dicted approval as separate dependent variables, we ran a
2x2 between-subject ANOVA, where the ﬁrst factor was
the type of deal (Taboo or Taboo+) and the second factor
was whether the subject held a sacred value or not. There
was a signiﬁcant interaction for predicted approval (see
Figure 1; F(1, 71) = 4.89, p = .0303) and predicted anger
(see Figure 2; F(1, 71) = 12.31, p = .0008).
Subjects who held the nuclear program to be sacred
predicted less support (t(6)=2.40, p = .0536, d = 1.96)
and more anger (t(6)=6.24, p = .0008, d = 4.65) for the
materially superior Taboo+ deal, compared to the Taboo
deal. Subjects who did not hold Iranian nuclear power as
a sacred value were uninﬂuenced by the added material
incentive. Using the measure of suspiciousness toward
the deal as a covariate in the analyses did not change the
results; therefore the backﬁre effect of material incentives
cannot be attributed to greater suspicions regarding the
Taboo+ deal.
4 Discussion
Previous research into the backﬁre effect of offering ma-
terial incentives to induce compromise over sacred val-
ues has concentrated on issues with predominantly re-
ligious connotations, such as sacred land. The present
1
2
3
4
5
6
Le
ss
 a
ng
er
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
M
or
e 
an
ge
r
noSV
Taboo
noSV
Taboo+
SV
Taboo
SV
Taboo+
Predicted anger
Figure 2: Predicted anger (means and standard errors,
with the scale reversed so that high numbers repre-
sent greater anger) as a function of additional incentives
(Taboo vs Taboo+) and Sacred Value (SV). Each small
gray point is a subject.
results suggest that relatively short-lived political discus-
sions can result in strong attitudes which have properties
of sacred values. It is important to note that these effects
were found in an online, English-speaking sample, a sam-
ple which is probably less exposed to the Iranian sacred
rhetoric. Although the effect sizes were large, we would
predict that Iranians living in Iran with limited access to
Western media might show even stronger effects.2
It appears that achieving nuclear capability has the ca-
pacity for assuming sacredness for Iranians. Some have
cautioned the U.S. administration that “You don’t bring
down a quasi-holy symbol — nuclear power — by cut-
ting off gasoline sales” (Cohen, 2009).3 Our empirical re-
sults support this stance, suggesting that a policy wholly
based on a “carrots and sticks” approach may actually
backﬁre. In conﬂicts involving sacred values, symbolic
2We also note that the critical sample, those with sacred values, was
quite small, 8 subjects. We still feel that these results should be taken
seriously. First, the present results are a conceptual replication of the
Ginges et al. (2007) study in a different context, thus plausible and not
surprising in themselves. Second, small samples as such do not com-
promise the meaning of statistical signiﬁcance. Signiﬁcant results with
small samples require large effect sizes. It is worth noting that, in gen-
eral, the probability of replication of a result is dependent on p-levels
but not affected by sample size (e.g., Killeen, 2005).
3Events at the time of writing are instructive. On November 27,
2009 The New York Times reported that the United States was work-
ing on a package of sanctions to impose on Iran if the Iranians did not
halt the construction of an Iranian uranium enrichment facility at Qum
(Cooper & Broad, 2009). Two days later, the BBC reported the Iranians
countering with an “act of deﬁance” (“Iran planning 10 new uranium
enrichment sites”, 2009)
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compromises which may lack any material beneﬁts, such
as apologies for past disrespects, may be key to solving
the issue (Atran, Axelrod & Davis, 2007). To the extent
that these sentiments pervade thinking and policymaking
in Iran, the debate may need to shift from sanctions and
“business-like” negotiations to symbolic gestures (Atran
& Ginges, 2009). Given the enormous political stakes
involved in these types of issues, further research along
these lines is urgently needed.
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